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Abstract
Decision-making typically requires judgments about causal relations: we need to
know the causal e§ects of our actions and the causal relevance of various environ-
mental factors. We investigate how several individualsí causal judgments can be
aggregated into collective causal judgments. First, we consider the aggregation
of causal judgments via the aggregation of probabilistic judgments, and identify
the limitations of this approach. We then explore the possibility of aggregating
causal judgments independently of probabilistic ones. Formally, we introduce
the problem of causal-network aggregation. Finally, we revisit the aggregation
of probabilistic judgments when this is constrained by prior aggregation of qual-
itative causal judgments.
1 Introduction
Decision making typically requires judgments about causal relations. Home owners
need to know whether putting locks in their doors will make their houses more secure.
Jurors need to know whether the accused is causally responsible for damages before
they can assess whether he or she is legally responsible. Aid agencies need to know how
the di§erent projects they can invest in will a§ect the lives of those they are concerned
about; and so on. Opinions about the nature and strength of causal relations often
di§er, even among experts. How to handle such diversity of opinion is the topic of
this paper. We investigate the possibility of coherently aggregating di§erent causal
judgments into a single one that may be applied to the decision problem at hand.
The basic set-up of this aggregation problem is the following. Individuals make
judgments about both the nature of the causal relations between the variables in
some set V = fV;W; :::g and the probabilities of these variables taking certain val-
ues, unconditionally or conditionally on the values of other variables. The task is to
!Previous versions of this paper were presented at a Choice Group seminar at the LSE, 10/2006,
the 2006 conference of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vancouver, 11/2006, and the 2nd
Philosophy of Biology at Dolphin Beach workshop, Kioloa, NSW, 8/2007. We thank the seminar and
conference participants as well as two anonymous referees for very helpful comments and suggestions.
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construct a single aggregate judgment on the causal relations between the variables
and the relevant probabilities in a way that preserves, as much as possible, the in-
formation contained in the individualsí judgments. For present purposes, we assume
that individualsí judgments are coherent. More generally, one might allow (localized)
incoherence in some of the individualsí judgments, or allow that individuals do not
make judgments about all causal relations or all probabilities in question. Their judg-
ments could be restricted to just certain variables relevant to the decision problem
at hand, or further still, to just some subset of them or just one type of judgment:
causal or probabilistic.
The causal judgments of individuals could be represented in a number of di§er-
ent ways, but here we adopt the framework familiar from the work of Pearl [2000],
Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines [2000] (see also [1990]), and others, in which they are
represented by Bayesian networks: directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) with associated
conditional probabilities. We do not intend thereby to take a position on the nature
of causal judgments, nor on the question of whether they can ultimately be analysed
probabilistically.1 Anyone who holds the view that causal judgments are just features
of probability judgments ñ for instance, that to judge that X causes Y is to hold cer-
tain conditional probability judgments, such as that the conditional probability of Y
given X exceeds its unconditional probability ñ is free to regard the Bayesian network
representations as adding no information to the underlying probability judgments. In
principle, we could also study the aggregation of causal judgments in another frame-
work, for instance by representing causal judgments as counterfactual beliefs of the
right kind.
A DAG represents an individualís qualitative judgment of causal relevance and
irrelevance between variables. Her quantitative judgment of causal dependence is
reáected in the associated conditional probabilities for the values of these variables,
given the values of any variables on which they are directly causally dependent. The
individualís unconditional probabilities for the values of the given variables can then
be computed from their conditional probabilities together with the individualís un-
conditional probabilities for the parent variables. Consider the following example,
which we will use at various points in the discussion.
Example: Predicting famine. An aid agency wishes to do some advance planning
for its famine relief operations and consults several experts in order to determine
the risk of famine in a particular region. All agree that the relevant variables are
R: rainfall, Y : crop yields, P : political conáict, and of course F : famine. But
they disagree both on the causal relations between the four variables and on the
probabilities of the various values that these variables may take. All consider rainfall
to be the main determinant of crop yield. However, while Expert 1 thinks that poor
1A probabilistic analysis may involve variables not included in the DAGs we consider.
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Figure 1: Expert causal judgments
crop yield and disruptive political conáict are the main causes of famine, Expert 2
thinks that the causal ináuence of political conáict on famine is indirect, via the e§ect
of the disruption of agricultural production on crop yields. Expert 3 considers the
relationship between political conáict and famine to be more complicated still, with
political conáict both causing famine directly, by disrupting food distribution, and
indirectly, through the ináuence on crop yields. These three opinions are represented
in Figure 1 by a set of DAGs.
The fact that individuals make both causal and probabilistic judgments raises the
question of whether aggregation of both kinds of judgments should be conducted all
at once or in two stages. In Section 2, we focus on what we call one-stage aggrega-
tion, in which only probability judgments are aggregated. This approach draws on
the standard literature on probabilistic opinion pooling (as reviewed, e.g., by Genest
and Zidek [1986]). It is motivated mainly by the thought that the probability judg-
ments of individuals reáect their causal judgments in various ways and hence that the
problem of causal judgment aggregation may be solved by constraining probability
aggregation so as to preserve the causal information contained in probability judg-
ments. Our verdict on this possibility, however, is largely negative. In Sections 3 to 5,
we therefore pursue an alternative two-stage approach, aggregating Örst the qualita-
tive causal judgments represented by the DAGs (Section 3) and then the quantitative
probabilistic ones (Sections 4 and 5), on the assumption that a consensus about the
causal relations between variables has been reached. Our analysis builds on results
from the literature on binary judgment aggregation, which combines ideas from social
choice theory with ideas from logic.2
2The formal logic-based analysis of binary judgment aggregation was introduced by List and Pettit
[2002], [2004] and, in generalized form, by Dietrich [2007]. For a survey, see List and Puppe [2009].
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2 One-stage aggregation
The problem of aggregating causal judgments has not received much attention, at
least in the form presented here, but there is a vast literature on aggregrating expert
opinions, mainly in statistics, and especially on aggregating expert probabilities. (As
already mentioned, an excellent guide to that literature is the survey paper of Genest
and Zidek [1986].) In this section, we draw on this literature to examine the possibil-
ity of reasonable one-stage aggregation of several individualsí judgments. One-stage
aggregation may be the only method available in cases in which individuals make no
explicit causal judgments or their causal judgments are very incomplete. It is nat-
ural, moreover, for those holding a probabilistic view about causation to rely on this
method. But one-stage aggregation may also be motivated by the less controversial
thought that the causal judgments of individuals are reáected in (even if they are
not reducible to) the relations between the individualsí unconditional and conditional
probabilities for the relevant events. If this is so, then even on a non-reductionistic
view about causal judgments one may hope that probability aggregation could be con-
strained in a manner which preserves the causal judgments implicit in probabilistic
ones.
Broadly, there are three classical approaches to probability aggregation: linear
pooling, geometric pooling, and supra-Bayesian approaches. The last approach is
directed at a slightly di§erent problem to ours ñ namely that of how an individual
expert should modify his judgments in the light of the expressed judgments of other
experts ñ and so we can set it aside. The other two approaches assume that the
expertsí opinions have reached an equilibrium state and that no further modiÖcation
of their viewpoints will take place before the relevant decision has to be made.
Consider an opinion aggregation problem of the following form. A set of events is
given (e.g., the event ìhigh political conáictî or ìlow political conáict and famineî),
and the task is to merge the probability judgments of individuals 1; :::; n (the ìex-
pertsî) on these events into an aggregate probability judgment on the events.3 So,
we have to merge (individual) probability functions Pr1; :::;Prn into an (aggregate)
probability function Pr. Many aggregation rules are imaginable. Formally, a proba-
bility aggregation rule is a function that assigns to each n-tuple hPr1; :::;Prni (called
a proÖle) of individual probability functions an aggregate probability function Pr.
Of the various possible aggregation rules, linear pooling stands out for a variety
of formal and conceptual reasons (e.g., Aczel and Wager [1980]; McConway [1981];
Lehrer and Wagner [1981]; and Dietrich and List [2007]). In particular, the following
3Events can be identiÖed with subsets of a given set of possible worlds. In many formal results,
the set of events considered (i.e., the domain of the individual probability functions Pr1; :::;Prn and
the aggregate probability function Pr) forms an algebra : the negation (complement) of any event is
also an event, and the disjunction (union) of any two events is an event too.
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axiomatic argument can be given. Let us require the aggregation rule to satisfy two
seemingly natural conditions:
Ind (Event-wise Independence) The aggregate probability of any given event X de-
pends only on the individualsí probabilities of X (regardless of the individualsí
probabilities of other events Y ).4
ZP (Zero Preservation) The aggregate probability of any given event X is zero when-
ever all individuals give X zero probability.5
Applied to the event ìfamineî, for instance, Zero Preservation implies that famine
is assigned an aggregate probability of zero if all individual experts assign a probability
of zero to it. Event-wise independence implies that the aggregate probability of famine
depends only on the probabilities that the individual experts assign to that event,
not on the probabilities they assign to a certain level of crop yield, political conáict,
etc. (This is not to deny, of course, that individuals form their judgments regarding
famine in the light of their judgments on crop yield, political conáict etc.)
Perhaps surprisingly, the only aggregation rules satisfying these two conditions
are linear pooling functions: the aggregate probability of any event X is a (possibly
weighted) arithmetic average of the individual probabilities of X, i.e.,
Pr(X) = w1Pr1(X) + :::+ wnPrn(X),
where the weights w1; :::; wn & 0 add up to one and are the same for all events X
(Aczel and Wager [1980]; McConway [1981]).6 Examples of linear pooling functions
are equal-weight averaging (w1 = ::: = wn = 1=n) and dictatorial aggregation (some
individual i has weight wi = 1 and all others have weight 0).
The natural interpretation of these weights is in terms of judgmental competence,
so that the choice of a particular linear pooling rule is dictated by considerations
of the relative expertise of the individuals whose opinions are being sought. In this
light, the fact that linear pooling rules assign weights to the opinions of individuals
that are independent of the object of these opinions seems quite unsatisfactory, since
individuals may be more or less expert on di§erent kinds of issues and it would seem
natural to vary the weights on their opinions to reáect this. The aid agency would
do well to consult climatologists, agriculturalists, and political scientists to reach
a balanced view on the causes of famine, but in doing so it would be reasonable
for it to give more weight to the climatologistsí probabilities for rainfall than to
4Formally, Pr(X) is a function of Pr1(X); :::;Prn(X). This function may be a di§erent one for
di§erent events X.
5Formally, Pr(X) = 0 if Pr1(X) = ::: = Prn(X) = 0.
6This result requires that the set of events considered forms an algebra (see footnote 3) and
contains at least three events apart from the contradiction (empty set of worlds) and the tautology
(set of all worlds). For a generalization, see Dietrich and List [2007].
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the political scientistsí, but more weight to the political scientistsí probabilities for
political conáict.7
Our main concern here, however, is with the question of whether linear pooling
functions satisfactorily respect the causal knowledge of the individual experts. An in-
dividualís causal judgments will be reáected in certain (unconditional or conditional)
independencies in his or her probability judgments. For instance, if individual i be-
lieves that events X and Y do not causally a§ect each other but have a common
cause Z (and have no other common causes, except for those that a§ect X and Y
via Z), then he or she will take X and Y to be probabilistically independent given
Z,8 because any probabilistic correlation between X and Y is ìscreened o§î by con-
ditionalising on Z. A minimal requirement of respecting causal judgments is that
at least unanimously held causal judgments be reáected in the aggregate probability
function Pr. That is, Pr should display at least those (conditional) independencies
that are supported by unanimous causal judgments. For example, if all individuals
judge X and Y to be causally independent with common cause Z, then that indepen-
dence judgment should be reáected in the aggregate probability function Pr. This
motivates the following condition on probability aggregation:
IP (Independence Preservation) For any given events X;Y; Z, if all individuals judge
X and Y to be probabilistically independent given Z, then this conditional
independence also holds under the aggregate probability function.9
Note that, by preserving all unanimous probabilistic independencies (conditional
or unconditional), we may also preserve independencies that are not grounded in
unanimous causal judgments. For instance, it may be that all individuals judge X
and Y to be independent given Z, but some do so on the grounds of judging that
X indirectly causes Y through Z, others on the grounds of judging that Y indirectly
causes X through Z, still others on the grounds of judging that X, Y , and Z are en-
tirely causally disconnected. Even in this case of causal disagreement, Independence
Preservation requires the preservation of probabilistic conditional independence. The
purely probabilistic informational basis of one-stage aggregation does not allow us to
distinguish between di§erent motivations (causal or other) behind probabilistic inde-
pendencies. Without explicit causal information, all we can do is to use Independence
Preservation to preserve all unanimous causal judgments, at the cost of preserving
even those conditional independencies that are not causally motivated.
It turns out, however, that Independence Preservation is violated by all linear
pooling functions (unless some individual i gets maximal weight wi = 1) and thus by
7See Bradley [2000] for further discussion of this issue. On problems with the assignment of
di§erentiated expert rights, see also Dietrich and List [2008].
8Formally, Pri(XY jZ) = Pri(XjZ) Pri(Y jZ).
9Formally, if, for all individuals i, Pri(Z) > 0 and Pri(XY jZ) = Pri(XjZ) Pri(Y jZ), then also
Pr(Z) > 0 and Pr(XY jZ) = Pr(XjZ) Pr(Y jZ).
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all non-dictatorial probability aggregation rules satisfying Event-wise Independence
and Zero Preservation. This fact, proven in Genest and Wagner [1984], can be il-
lustrated using our earlier example.10 Suppose the aid agency consults a couple of
experts in order to determine the risk of famine in a particular region and that both
experts agree that famine is caused by a combination of drought (the event of rain-
fall R below some critical threshold) and political instability (the event of political
conáict P above some critical threshold), which undermines local solutions to poor
crop yields. Furthermore, they agree that these two factors are both causally and
probabilistically independent, at least in the short term. But they disagree on the
probability of drought and of political instability. Since neither speaks with greater
authority than the other, the aid agency calculates its probabilities for these events
by taking the linear average of the judgments of the two experts.
Let D and I, respectively, denote the occurrence of drought and political insta-
bility in the region and DI their concurrence. Let Pr1, Pr2, and Pr, respectively, be
the probability functions of Expert 1, Expert 2, and the aid agency. Since pooling
happens by averaging, the aid agency will assign the following probabilities:
Pr(D) =
Pr1(D) + Pr2(D)
2
, Pr(I) =
Pr1(I) + Pr2(I)
2
,
Pr(DI) =
Pr1(DI) + Pr2(DI)
2
=
Pr1(D) Pr1(I) + Pr2(D) Pr2(I)
2
,
where the last identity uses the expertsí judgments that D and I are independent.
These independence judgments are preserved if and only if Pr(DI) = Pr(D) Pr(I),
i.e., if and only if
Pr1(D) Pr1(I) + Pr2(D) Pr2(I)
2
=
Pr1(D) + Pr2(D)
2
' Pr1(I) + Pr2(I)
2
.
By multiplying both sides of this equation by 4, developing the product on the right-
hand side, and simplifying, it follows that
Pr1(D) Pr1(I) + Pr2(D) Pr2(I) = Pr1(D) Pr2(I) + Pr2(D) Pr1(I)
, Pr1(D)(Pr1(I)) Pr2(I)) = Pr2(D)(Pr1(I)) Pr2(I))
, (Pr1(D)) Pr2(D))(Pr1(I)) Pr2(I)) = 0.
The latter can hold only if Pr1(D) = Pr2(D) or Pr1(I) = Pr2(I); i.e., if the experts
agree on the probability of drought or of political instability ñ which is not the case
by assumption. So equal-weight linear pooling violates Independence Preservation.
Similar violations can be constructed for non-equal weights (unless one individual i
gets maximal weight wi = 1).
10Relatedly, Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines [2000] observe that if we mix two or more probabil-
ity distributions that each display certain conditional independence relations, the resulting mixture
may fail to display those conditional independence relations. In particular, if we take two or more
probability distributions that are each compatible with the same DAG (satisfying the causal Markov
condition), their linear mixture may not be compatible with that DAG.
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While we have focused on linear pooling as a way of aggregating probability
judgments, the di¢culty with preserving causal insights at the aggregate level is a very
general one. Genest and Wagner [1984] have shown that Independence Preservation
is violated by many (linear or non-linear) probability aggregation rules, including
geometric averaging, the most prominent alternative to linear averaging. Thus the
di¢culty of preserving causal knowledge is not an artifact of requiring Event-wise
Independence (a condition violated for instance by geometric averaging).
Genest and Wagner [1984] interpret this Önding as evidence that Independence
Preservation is not a reasonable condition. We would not like to go so far. In our
view, those unanimous independence judgments that are grounded in unanimous
causal judgments about the world should not be overruled. We take Genest and
Wagnerís impossibility Önding not as a reason to abandon the goal of preserving
judgments of independence, but as a reason to move to a two-stage approach that
explicitly takes qualitative causal judgments into account.
3 Two-stage aggregation: the qualitative stage
Under our proposed two-stage approach to aggregation, qualitative causal judgments
are aggregated Örst, and quantitative, probabilistic ones only subsequently. Fur-
thermore, the latter are aggregated in a way that di§ers from standard probability
aggregation, namely in a way that is constrained by the qualitative causal judgments
formed at the Örst stage. This two-stage approach will satisfy a version of Indepen-
dence Preservation restricted to unanimously held causal independencies.
As before, let V = fV;W; :::g be a (Önite) non-empty set of variables. In our
example of the aid agency above, V contains the variables R (rainfall), Y (crop
yields), P (political conáict), and F (famine). How can we represent qualitative
judgments on how the variables in V are causally interrelated? Let us introduce a
binary predicate symbol c to represent a causal relevance relation on V, where, for
any two variables V and W in V, we write V cW to mean that V is directly causally
relevant to W . (For brevity, we speak of ìcausal relevanceî, but we mean ìdirect
causal relevanceî.11) In the case of the aid agency, an expert who thinks that rainfall
is causally relevant to crop yield whereas political conáict is not would hold that
RcY but not that PcY . A causal relevance relation c is called acyclic if, for any Önite
sequence V1; V2; : : : ; Vk of variables in V, it is not the case that
V1cV2; V2cV3; : : : ; Vk!1cVk and VkcV1:
A causal relevance relation c induces a directed graph whose vertices are the variables
in V and whose edges (arrows connecting vertices) are deÖned as follows: for any two
11 If we wanted to use our formal framework to capture indirect as well as direct causal relationships,
we would have to invoke the transitive closure of the relation c.
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variables V and W in V, there is an edge from V in the direction of W if and only
if V cW . This graph is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) if c is an acyclic relation.12
A Bayesian network is a DAG with associated conditional probabilities: each
variable in the graph is endowed with a conditional probability distribution given its
parents in the graph. In this section, however, we set this quantitative information
aside and focus on qualitative features of the DAG alone. In particular, we investigate
how a group of individuals can arrive at an aggregate judgment on what the causal
relevance relation c between the variables in V is.
Consider a group of n individuals, labelled 1, 2, ..., n, each of whom holds a par-
ticular judgment on the nature of the causal relevance relation between the variables
in V. We write ci to denote the causal relevance relation according to individual
iís judgment. A combination of causal relevance relations across the n individuals
is called a proÖle and denoted hc1; c2; :::; cni. A causal judgment aggregation rule is
a function that assigns to each proÖle hc1; c2; :::; cni (in some domain of admissible
proÖles) a single aggregate causal relevance relation c.
To give some examples of causal judgment aggregation rules, consider the class
of threshold rules. A threshold rule, with threshold k (where 1 * k * n), assigns to
each proÖle hc1; c2; :::; cni the causal relevance relation c deÖned as follows: for any
two variables V and W in V,
V cW , at least k individuals have V ciW .
Examples of threshold rules are the majority rule (k = n+12 ), the union rule (k = 1)
and the intersection (or unanimity) rule (k = n).
Are these satisfactory causal judgment aggregation rules? It is easy to see that
each of these three rules has a considerable defect. The majority and union rules
fail to ensure acyclicity of the aggregate causal relevance relation, even when all
individuals hold acyclic such relations. To see this, suppose the aid agency consults
three experts, with the following individual judgments. They all agree that rainfall
is causally relevant to crop yields, but they disagree on the causal relations between
the other variables. Expert 1 thinks that crop yields are causally relevant to famine,
which is causally relevant to political conáict. Expert 2 thinks that famine is causally
relevant to political conáict, which is causally relevant to crop yields. Expert 3 thinks
that political conáict is causally relevant to crop yields, which is causally relevant to
famine. In consequence, the causal relevance relation generated by the majority rule
violates acyclicity: the relation contains a cycle from crop yields to famines to political
conáict to crop yields. It is obvious that the union rule has the same defect. The
intersection (or unanimity) rule, by contrast, ensures acyclicity of the aggregate causal
relevance relation, but may generate a sparse or even empty such relation, with few
12Note that our deÖnition of acyclicity also rules out cycles of length k = 1, i.e., we cannot have
V cV for any variable V .
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variables deemed causally relevant to any others, whenever there are disagreements
between the experts.
Although threshold rules are particularly salient examples of causal judgment
aggregation rules, they are by no means the only ones. So let us adopt an axiomatic
approach and look for rules satisfying certain conditions.
UD (Universal Domain) The causal judgment aggregation rule accepts as admissible
any logically possible proÖle of acyclic causal relevance relations.
AC (Acyclicity) The aggregate causal relevance relation is always acyclic.
UB (Unbiasedness) For any two variables V and W in V, the aggregate judgment
on whether V is causally relevant to W depends only on individual judgments
on whether V is causally relevant to W (the independence requirement), and
the aggregation rule is neutral between whether or not this is the case (the
neutrality requirement).13
ND (Non-Dictatorship) There does not exist a Öxed individual such that, for every
admissible proÖle of causal relevance relations, the aggregate causal relevance
relation is the one held by that individual.
Although these conditions may seem natural at Örst sight, they are mutually
inconsistent.
Theorem 1 If V contains three or more variables, there exists no causal judgment
aggregation rule satisfying UD, AC, UB, and ND.
This result follows from an impossibility theorem by Dietrich and List [2010]
concerning the aggregation of binary judgments on logically connected propositions.
Qualitative causal judgments in the sense investigated here are simply binary (ìtrueî
/ ìfalseî) judgments on propositions of the form ìvariable V is (or is not) directly
causally relevant to variable Wî, where di§erent such propositions constrain each
other via the acyclicity constraint on causal relevance. For example, the set of propo-
sitions fìV is directly causally relevant to Wî, ìW is directly causally relevant to
Uî, and ìU is directly causally relevant to V îg is logically inconsistent relative to
the acyclicity constraint. From the theory of judgment aggregation, we know that
the aggregation of binary judgments on logically connected propositions is subject to
a family of impossibility results broadly similar to Arrowís impossibility theorem on
preference aggregation, as surveyed in List and Puppe [2009] and, more recently, List
[2012]. Our present theorem belongs to this family of results. What are the possible
escape routes from this impossibility?
13Formally, for any V and W in V and any admissible proÖles hc1; c2; :::; cni and hc!1; c!2; :::; c!ni, if
[for all i, V ciW if and only if not V c!iW ] then [V cW if and only if not V c
!W ]. This formal statement
is slightly weaker than the informal one in the main text but implies it under UD and AC.
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The Örst route: relaxing universal domain. We may use a causal judgment
aggregation rule that accepts, as admissible input, not all logically possible proÖles of
acyclic causal relevance relations, but only those that meet an additional structural
condition: namely proÖles which, informally speaking, reáect a certain amount of co-
hesion across di§erent individualsí causal judgments. The additional structural condi-
tion on proÖles might be such that the majority rule, or perhaps some other threshold
rule, never generates an aggregate causal relevance relation violating acyclicity. In
this case, the majority rule or threshold rule in question could be employed on this
restricted domain of admissible proÖles. We consider two structural conditions of this
kind.
Temporal-order restriction. Suppose the individuals agree on the temporal order
in which the events captured by the variables in V occur. Suppose further they agree
that a variable V can be causally relevant to another variable W only if V strictly
precedes W in this temporal order. Call any proÖle of causal relevance relations that
is consistent with some such agreement temporal-order restricted. Formally, a proÖle
is temporal-order restricted if there exists some weak order of the variables in V (a
reáexive, transitive, and connected binary relation on V) such that, for every pair of
variables V andW inV, if some individual judges V to be causally relevant toW (i.e.,
some i holds V ciW ) then V strictly precedes W in that order. For any such proÖle,
the causal relevance relation generated by any threshold rule is acyclic, no matter
how low or high the threshold is. The temporal constraint on what causal relevance
judgments are deemed admissible guarantees the absence of any causal cycles at both
the individual and aggregate levels.
Unidimensional alignment. Another structural condition on proÖles that ensures
acyclical causal judgments at the aggregate level ñ here under the majority rule
(or any threshold rule with a higher threshold) ñ is unidimensional alignment (List
[2003]; for generalizations, see Dietrich and List [2010]). A proÖle of causal relevance
relations is called unidimensionally aligned if the individuals can be linearly ordered
from left to right such that, for each pair of variables V and W in V, the individuals
who hold that V is causally relevant to W (i.e., the individuals i with V ciW ) are
all to the left or all to the right of those who hold that V is not causally relevant
to W (i.e., the individuals i who do not have V ciW ).14 For any unidimensionally
aligned proÖle, the causal relevance relation generated by the majority rule is acyclic
and coincides with the causal relevance relation held by the median individual with
respect to the left-right ordering of the individuals. (Or, if the number of individuals
is even, it coincides with the intersection of the causal relevance relations held by the
two median individuals.)
14This allows that, for some pairs of variables, the individuals a¢rming causal relevance are to the
left of those who do not, while for other pairs of variables the former are to the right of the latter.
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It is an empirical question whether a group of experts ñ either before or after a
period of joint deliberation ñ exhibits su¢cient agreement in their causal judgments
to meet the condition of temporal-order restriction or that of unidimensional align-
ment. The kind of temporal agreement required for temporal-order restriction seems
empirically plausible at least in some situations.
The second route: relaxing acyclicity. A logically possible way to avoid the
impossibility result of Theorem 1 is to give up the requirement that the aggregate
causal relevance relation be acyclic. This, however, would constitute a major depar-
ture from the consensus on the nature of causal relations, which are widely held to
be acyclic (Pearl [2000]).
The third route: relaxing unbiasedness. We may use a causal judgment ag-
gregation rule that violates the condition of unbiasedness. There are two ways of
relaxing this condition.
A neutrality relaxation. If we relax the neutrality part of unbiasedness, there can
exist pairs of variables V and W in V such that the aggregation rule is not neutral
between whether or not V is causally relevant to W . Examples of causal judgment
aggregation rules violating neutrality are threshold rules with any threshold k di§erent
from simple majority. It can be shown that a threshold rule is guaranteed to generate
an acyclic causal relevance relation if and only if the threshold k exceeds m!1m n, where
m is the number of variables in V.
Let us explain why this constraint on the threshold is su¢cient to ensure acyclicity.
Suppose, for a contradiction, that a threshold rule with a threshold k above m!1m n
generates a cyclical causal relevance relation. There must then exist an admissible
proÖle hc1; c2; :::; cni of individually acyclic causal relevance relevance such that
V1cV2; :::; Vm0!1cVm0 ; and Vm0cV1;
where c is the aggregate causal relevance relation and V1, V2, ..., Vm0 are distinct
variables in V, with 2 * m0 * m.15 Given the deÖnition of our threshold rule, there
must be at least k individuals with V1ciV2; at least k individuals with V2ciV3; and so
on. Let N1, N2, ..., Nm0 be the sets of individuals i with V1ciV2; V2ciV3; ..., Vm0cV1,
respectively. Since k exceeds m!1m n, each of these sets must contain more than
m!1
m n
individuals. But, for combinatorial reasons, any m or fewer subsets of size greater
than m!1m n from a set of n individuals must have a non-empty intersection. For
example, any two or fewer subsets of size greater than 12n must have a non-empty
intersection; any three or fewer subsets of size greater than 23n must have a non-empty
15Aggregate cycles of length 1 (where V cV for some variable V in V ) could never occur under any
threshold rule, since no individual i will have V ciV (assuming acyclicity at the individual level).
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intersection; and so on. Since m0 * m, this implies that there must exist at least one
individual i who is contained in all of N1, N2, ..., Nm0 , and he or she must then have
V1ciV2; :::; Vm0!1ciVm0 ; and Vm0ciV1:
But this contradicts individual acyclicity, which completes the argument.
Conversely, if the threshold k does not exceed m!1m n, it becomes possible to con-
struct an admissible proÖle hc1; c2; :::; cni of individually acyclic causal relevance re-
lations such that, for some set of distinct variables V1, V2, ..., Vm0 , each of V1cV2, ...,
Vm0!1cVm0 , and Vm0cV1 is a¢rmed by k or more individuals. For such a proÖle, the
intersection of the relevant sets N1, N2, ..., Nm0 is empty, and hence the presence of
a cycle in the aggregate causal relevance relation does not conáict with acyclicity in
the individual relations. Formally, our necessary and su¢cient condition for acylicity
(namely a threshold k above m!1m n) can be derived from a characterization of con-
sistent (but possibly incomplete) quota rules in judgment aggregation (Dietrich and
List [2007]; the present combinatorial argument builds on a result in List [2001], ch.
9).
Note that if the set of variables V is inÖnite, only the intersection (or unanimity)
rule guarantees acyclicity at the aggregate level. However, if V is Önite, then a
supermajority rule with a suitably high threshold is su¢cient. A problem with this
approach, as noted above, is that it may lead to sparse or even empty aggregate
causal relevance relations unless the disagreement between experts is limited.
An independence relaxation. If we relax the independence part of unbiasedness,
there can exist pairs of variables V and W in V such that the aggregate judgment
on whether V is causally relevant to W depends not only on individual judgments on
whether V is causally relevant to W but also on individual judgments involving other
variables. Examples of causal judgment aggregation rules violating independence are
sequential priority rules (adapted from List [2004]) and distance-based rules (adapted
from Pigozzi [2006] and Miller and Osherson [2009]). Under a sequential priority rule,
the di§erent possible pairs of variables are considered one by one in a given order
(which may be chosen, for example, by some criterion of epistemic priority). On each
pair of variables V;W , the aggregate judgment is then determined as follows:
(i) If the question of whether V is causally relevant to W is constrained (in light
of the acyclicity requirement) by the aggregate judgments on pairs of variables
considered earlier in the given order, then the aggregate judgment on V ís causal
relevance to W is derived from those earlier constraints.
(ii) If it is not constrained in this way, then the aggregate judgment on V ís causal
relevance to W is made by applying some voting method, such as majority
voting, to the individual judgments on V vis-‡-vis W .
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This approach guarantees acyclicity of the aggregate causal relevance relation, but
at the expense of path-dependence: the order in which causal judgments are made
on di§erent pairs of variables may determine what the aggregate causal relevance
relation will look like. An agenda setter on a committee of experts may strategically
exploit this feature of the causal judgment aggregation rule by proposing an order
of priority among di§erent pairs of variables that is likely to give rise to aggregate
causal judgments that he or she wants the committee to make.
Under a distance-based rule, we Örst deÖne a distance metric between causal
relevance relations. For instance, we could deÖne the distance between two relations
c and c0 to be the number of ordered pairs of variables V;W on which c and c0 disagree,
i.e., d(c; c0) = jf(V;W ) 2 V2 : V cW < V c0Wgj. (This is the Hamming distance.) We
then deÖne the aggregate causal relevance relation for any given proÖle hc1; c2; :::; cni
as an acyclic causal relevance relation c that minimizes the total distance from the
individual causal relevance relations, i.e., where
P
i=1;:::;n d(c; ci) is minimal. Since
there need not be a unique such distance-minimizing relation c, we may require an
additional rule for breaking ties. Distance-based rules can be interpreted as generating
compromise causal relevance relations.
In some cases, a rather signiÖcant departure from independence (as a property
of the aggregation rule) may be desirable. Suppose, for instance, that all individuals
agree that there is a causal path from V1 to V2, but di§erent individuals disagree
about the intermediate variables along this path. Some think that the path goes
from V1 to V3 to V2; others think it goes from V1 to V4 to V2; still others think it goes
from V1 to V5 to V2; and so on. In such a case, no single causal link between any pair
of variables is accepted by more than a small minority of the individuals. If we used a
causal judgment aggregation rule satisfying independence, say a threshold rule with
a majority or even sub-majority threshold, we could end up with an empty aggregate
causal relevance relation here, without any causal links at all. This would fail to
do justice to the fact that all individuals agree that V1 is at least indirectly causally
relevant to V2. We do not o§er a concrete proposal on how to handle such cases,
but mention it in order to illustrate why a signiÖcant relaxation of independence may
sometimes be justiÖed.16
The fourth route: relaxing non-dictatorship. A Önal way to avoid the impos-
sibility result of Theorem 1 is to allow the aggregate causal relevance relation to be
determined by an antecedently Öxed individual: a ìdictatorî. But since we are nor-
mally interested in the information contained in the causal judgments of more than
one individual, this is not generally an attractive solution to our aggregation problem.
Sometimes, however, it may be an acceptable compromise to appoint a trusted expert
as the ìdictatorî for arriving at qualitative causal judgments ñ in the form of a DAG
16We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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ñ while continuing ìdemocraticallyî when it comes to determining the associated
quantitative probability information at the second stage of our two-stage approach.
Concluding remark Which of the di§erent possible escape routes from the impos-
sibility result of Theorem 1 is compelling depends on details of the decision problem
at hand, the nature of the disagreements between the experts, the level of trust we
place in them, whether we are worried about possible agenda manipulation, and other
factors. In the next section, we assume that through one of the identiÖed routes ñ
excluding that of relaxing acyclicity ñ a ìconsensusî on a causal relevance relation
and thereby on a DAG has been achieved, and we turn to the question of how the
associated conditional probabilities can be determined.
4 Preliminaries to the quantitative stage
We have analysed how a group can arrive at an aggregate judgment on the qualitative
causal relations between variables. We now assume that such an aggregate causal
judgment has been reached through one of the routes just discussed and suppose
that the group seeks to make an aggregate probability judgment (about the variables
taking various values) that is compatible with the given aggregate causal judgment.
In its most general form ñ ignoring for the moment the causal judgment ñ a prob-
ability judgment can be represented by a joint probability function over the variables
in V. For simplicity, we assume that each variable can take Önitely, or countably in-
Önitely, many possible values. For example, we may distinguish between a particular
number of possible levels of conáict. Let us label the variables V1; :::; Vm. A joint
probability function Pr assigns a probability Pr(v1; :::; vm) & 0 to each combination
(v1; :::; vm) of values of these variables, where the sum of the probabilities is 1.
The joint probability Pr(v1; :::; vm) can be factorised into the product of condi-
tional probabilities:17
Pr(v1; :::; vm) = Pr(v1) Pr(v2jv1) Pr(v3jv2; v1) - - -Pr(vmjvm!1; :::; v1)
=
mY
j=1
Pr(vj jv1; :::; vj!1): (1)
In our famine example, where V1; V2; V3; V4 are the levels of rainfall, crop yield, po-
17 In this expression, the conditional probability Pr(vj jv1; :::; vj#1) can be derived from the joint
probability function Pr via the formula Pr(vj jv1; :::; vj#1) = Pr(v1;:::;vj)Pr(v1;:::;vj!1) (where Pr(v1; :::; vj) and
Pr(v1; :::; vj#1) are marginal probabilities derived from Pr), provided that Pr(v1; :::; vj#1) 6= 0. If
Pr(v1; :::; vj#1) = 0, then Pr(vj jv1; :::; vj#1) can be viewed either as undeÖned or as a primitive not
derived from the function Pr. Under both interpretations, the factorisation (1) is still possible even if
some Pr(v1; :::; vj#1) is zero whatever value is substituted for Pr(vj jv1; :::; vj#1) (because some other
factor on the right-hand side of (1) will be zero, as will be the left-hand side of (1)).
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litical conáict, and famine, we have
P (v1; v2; v3; v4) = P (v1)P (v2jv1)P (v3jv1; v2)P (v4jv1; v2; v3).
When is the probability judgment expressed by Pr compatible with a given causal
judgment? Recall that a causal judgment takes the form of a particular directed
acyclic graph (DAG) over the variables V1; :::; Vm, with an arrow from Vj to Vk just
in case Vj is considered causally relevant to Vk (VjcVk). For any variable Vj , we write
PA(Vj) to denote the list of Vj ís parent variables in the graph, and we write pa(Vj)
to denote any list of values of these parent variables.18
For instance, suppose that the consensus DAG in our famine example is as shown
in Figure 2: no variable is causally relevant to rainfall (V1); only rainfall (V1) is
causally relevant to crop yield (V2); only crop yield (V2) is causally relevant to political
conáict (V3); but both crop yield (V2) and political conáict (V3) are causally relevant
to famine (V4). Then PA(V1) contains no variable, PA(V2) contains precisely V1,
PA(V3) contains precisely V2, and PA(V4) contains both V2 and V3.
V2
V4
V1
V3
Figure 2: An illustrative aggregate causal judgment in the famine example
Without loss of generality, suppose the variables V1; :::; Vm are labelled such that
those with no parent come Örst, those with a parent but no grandparent come next,
those with a grandparent but no great-grandparent come thereafter, and so on. If
the original labelling V1; :::; Vm does not have this property, we can simply relabel
the variables appropriately and replace the factorisation (1) by one using the new
labelling. So the parents of any variable Vj come before Vj .19 But of course not all
of V1; :::; Vj!1 need to be causally relevant to Vj . For instance, in our famine example
V2 but not V1 is (directly) causally relevant to V3. Since causally irrelevant variables
should have no e§ect on Vj , the conditional probability Pr(vj jv1; :::; vj!1) should be
insensitive to the non-parental values among v1; :::; vj!1. In other words, it should be
18So pa(Vi) is any instantiation of PA(Vj).
19Formally, PA(Vj) is a sublist of (V1; :::; Vj#1).
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sensitive only to the sublist pa(Vj) of v1; :::; vj!1. Formally,
Pr(vj jv1; :::; vj!1) = Pr(vj jpa(Vj)). (2)
We say that the probability judgment Pr is compatible with the given aggregate causal
judgment if identity (2) holds for every variable Vj and every combination of values
v1; :::; vj with Pr(v1; :::; vj!1) 6= 0. (This compatibility requirement is the ordered
Markov condition, which is, in turn, equivalent to the parental Markov condition:
any variable is independent of its non-descendants given its parents.20) The joint
probability (1) then reduces to
Pr(v1; :::; vm) =
mY
j=1
Pr(vj jpa(Vj)). (3)
For instance, in our famine example,
P (v1; v2; v3; v4) = P (v1)P (v2jv1)P (v3jv2)P (v4jv2; v3).
5 Two-stage aggregation: the quantitative stage
As we seek to reach an aggregate probability judgment that is compatible with the
aggregate causal judgment, the probability function Pr should satisfy the decompo-
sition (3). This requirement is usually violated by standard, one-stage probability
aggregation, where the individual probability functions
Pr1(v1; :::; vn); :::;Prn(v1; :::; vn) (4)
are directly merged into an aggregate probability function Pr(v1; :::; vn). On our
proposed two-stage approach, by contrast, Pr is explicitly constructed so as to meet
the necessary decomposition requirement.
Let the aggregate causal relevance relation (the ìconsensusî DAG) be given, and
consider the decomposition constraint (3) relative to that relation. The quantitative
stage of our approach now consists in
(i) determining each factor of the decomposition, Pr(vj jpa(Vj)), through separate
probability aggregation, and
(ii) computing the joint probability function Pr(v1; :::; vm) as the product of these
separately determined factors.
20There are multiple equivalent ways to deÖne ìcompatibilityî of Pr with the DAG. In addition to
the ordered Markov condition and the parental Markov condition, a third deÖnition (chosen by Pearl)
is given in terms of the validity of the decomposition (3). On the equivalence of these deÖnitions, see
Theorems 1.2.6 and 1.2.7 in Pearl [2000].
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More formally, for every variable Vj inV and every combination pa(Vj) of parental
values, we merge the individual conditional probability functions
Pr1(vj jpa(Vj)); ::;Prn(vj jpa(Vj)) (5)
into an aggregate conditional probability function Pr(vj jpa(Vj)). These separate ag-
gregation exercises can each be performed, for example, by linear or geometric pooling.
In our famine example, this involves
merging Pr1(v1); ::;Prn(v1) into Pr(v1);
for any Öxed v1, merging Pr1(v2jv1); ::;Prn(v2jv1) into Pr(v2jv1);
for any Öxed v2, merging Pr1(v3jv2); ::;Prn(v3jv2) into Pr(v3jv2);
for any Öxed v2; v3, merging Pr1(v4jv2; v3); ::;Prn(v4jv2; v3) into Pr(v4jv2; v3).
(6)
The present approach has several distinctive properties, to which we now turn.
Compatibility with causal judgments. The aggregate probability function Pr,
given by (3), is automatically compatible with the aggregate causal relevance re-
lation, represented by the appropriate DAG. In particular, Pr respects the causal
Markov condition: any variable Vj is probabilistically independent of all its causal
non-descendants given its causal parents. In our famine example, Pr makes political
conáict independent of rainfall conditional on crop yield,21 and famine independent
of rainfall conditional on crop yield and political conáict.22 The causally motivated
conditional independencies are thus respected, whereas other conditional independen-
cies may or may not arise. By contrast, standard one-stage probability aggregation
does not generally produce an aggregate probability judgment that is consistent with
any prior judgments of causal relevance.
Preservation of causal (conditional) independencies. What about the preser-
vation of unanimously held independencies between variables (both conditional and
unconditional ones)? Suppose, for example, that all individuals consider variables
Vj and Vk probabilistically independent given Vl.23 Does the aggregate probability
judgment preserve this conditional independence? As we have seen, for standard
probability aggregation methods the answer is usually negative. Under our approach,
by contrast, causal conditional independencies are preserved. To see why, suppose all
individuals judge Vj and Vk to be probabilistically independent given Vl because of a
unanimous agreement that Vj ís only causal parent is Vl and that Vk is not a causal
descendant of Vj . Then the aggregate probability judgment respects this indepen-
dence: according to Pr, Vj and Vk are also probabilistically independent given Vl.24
21Formally, Pr(v1; v3jv2) = Pr(v1jv2) Pr(v3jv2).
22Formally, Pr(v1; v4jv2; v3) = Pr(v1jv2; v3) Pr(v4jv2; v3).
23Formally, Pri(vj ; vkjvl) = Pri(vj jvl) Pri(vkjvl).
24Formally, Pr(vj ; vkjvl) = Pr(vj jvl) Pr(vkjvl):
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The reason is that, so long as a ìreasonableî causal judgment aggregation rule is used
at the Örst stage of our two-stage process, we will have arrived at an aggregate causal
relevance relation that reáects the unanimous opinion on the causal relations between
Vj ; Vk; Vl; the second stage then leads to a probability function that is compatible with
this aggregate causal relevance relation.25
Variable expert weights In contrast to one-stage linear or geometric pooling of
probabilities, our approach is compatible with the assignment of di§erent weights
to di§erent expertsí judgments so as to reáect their di§erent levels of competence
on the relevant issues. Once the consensus DAG for the causes of famine is given,
for instance, greatest weight can be assigned to the climatologistís judgment in the
aggregate probability for rainfall (Pr(v1)), to the agriculturalistís judgment in the
aggregate conditional probability for crop yield, given a level of rainfall (Pr(v2jv1)),
and to the political scientistís judgment for the aggregate conditional probability for
political conáict, given crop yields (Pr(v3jv2)). In the limit, an aggregate judgment on
the probability of famine might be constructed using only the consensus DAG and the
judgments of the relevant expert on each variable. But as the literature on epistemic
democracy shows, there can be advantages to consulting a range of opinions provided
that all who are consulted are su¢ciently competent. Instead, the two-stage method
can be used to optimise the balance between competence and diversity of opinion by
suitable assignment of weights in the aggregation of probabilities for each variable.
Complexity reduction. Our two-stage approach subdivides an m-dimensional
probability aggregation problem into several one-dimensional ones. Rather than ag-
gregating joint probability functions over the vector V1; :::; Vm (of the form (4)), we
aggregate conditional probability functions of a single variable Vj (of the form (5)).
But we face several such aggregation problems, namely one for each variable Vj and
each Öxed combination of parent values paj(Vj). This is less demanding on the side
of individual inputs, as long as the aggregate DAG is not too rich in causal connec-
tions. To illustrate this complexity reduction, consider our famine example again,
and suppose for simplicity that each variable can take only two values, i.e., there are
only two levels of rainfall, two levels of crop yield, and so on. If we were to aggregate
the joint probability functions Pri(v1; v2; v3; v4) directly, each individual would have
25Note that unanimously held conditional independencies that are not causal (i.e., which are not
implied by the structure of the DAG, together with the Markov condition) are not generally preserved
under our approach. However, in the important special case in which all individuals hold the same
DAG (i.e., the causal structure is not in dispute) and satisfy faithfulness in relation to their probability
judgments, there will not be any unanimously held independencies between variables (conditional or
unconditional) that are not implied by the DAG, and hence all such unanimous independencies will
be preserved in the aggregation (assuming the unanimous DAG is also the aggregate DAG). We are
grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing this point.
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to submit 24)1 = 15 probability values (there are 24 possible combinations of values
(v1; v2; v3; v4), but once the probabilities of 24)1 of them are speciÖed, the remaining
probability is given by one minus the sum of the rest). Specifying any one of these
15 probabilities is hard in practice: what, for example, is the probability of a combi-
nation of high rainfall and low crop yield and low political conáict and high famine?
Under our approach, by contrast, each individual has to submit only probabilities or
conditional probabilities of singular events, like the probability of high rainfall or the
conditional probability of high crop yield given low rainfall. The number of required
probabilities is smaller than 15 in our example. Using (6), we can see that it equals
4X
j=1
ìnumber of possible values of Vj minus 1î
' ìnumber of possible parent values pa(Vj)î
= (2) 1)' 1 + (2) 1)' 2 + (2) 1)' 2 + (2) 1)' 22
= 1 + 2 + 2 + 4 = 9.
Types of informational input. Our approach not only reduces the complexity
of the aggregation problem; it also uses a di§erent informational input, compared
to one-stage probability aggregation. First, we use the additional information of the
individualsí qualitative causal judgments ñ the information aggregated at the Örst
stage of our two-stage process. Second, an interesting question arises about the nature
of the probabilistic input used at the second stage. Consider a variable Vj with parents
PA(Vj) in the aggregate causal relevance relation (DAG). Since that relation is the
result of the aggregation of individual causal relevance relations, some individuals
may not agree that the variables listed in PA(Vj) are the correct causal parents of
Vj . They may think instead that not all of these variables are causally relevant to
Vj or that some other variables are relevant, despite not being included in PA(Vj).
But then, what does such an individualís conditional probability Pri(vj jpa(Vj)) ñ
the informational input at the second stage ñ represent? For instance, individual
1ís causal relevance relation may be of the form V1 ! V2 ! V3, while all other
individualsí causal relevance relations may be of the form V1 ! V2  V3, which
might then also become the aggregate relation. Here, individual 1 disagrees with
everyone else about both PA(V2) and PA(V3): How should we interpret individual
1ís conditional probabilities Pr1(v2jpa(V2)) and Pr1(v3jpa(V3)) at the second stage of
our two-stage aggregation process? Similarly, what is someone supposed to answer
to the question ìhow probable is high political conáict given low crop yield?î if he or
she actually thinks that famine rather than crop yield is causally relevant to political
conáict?
There are at least three possible interpretations of an individualís conditional
probabilities in such cases: an evidential, a causal, and a hypothetical one. We begin
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with a discussion of the Örst two interpretations. To give an informal example, sup-
pose for a moment that, according to individual iís qualitative causal judgment, the
variables in PA(Vj) are not causally relevant to Vj but nonetheless probabilistically
correlated with Vj . Then, if Pri(vj jpa(Vj)) represents an evidential conditional prob-
ability, its value is sensitive to pa(Vj) (by probabilistic dependence), whereas if it is
understood as a causal conditional probability, its value does not depend on pa(Vj)
(by causal independence). More generally, an evidential conditional probability repre-
sents an agentís belief, given a particular evidential supposition (here the supposition
that the values of the variables in PA(Vj) are pa(Vj)). A causal conditional proba-
bility represents an agentís belief, given a particular counterfactual supposition (its
content again being that the values of the variables in PA(Vj) are pa(Vj)). This causal
conditional probability can be understood as resulting from supposing an external in-
tervention in our system that sets the values of the variables PA(Vj) to pa(Vj). The
two kinds of conditional probability take the same value if PA(Vj) consists of the cor-
rect causal parents according to individual iís qualitative causal judgment, but may
di§er in general.
Formally, in the evidential case, Pri(vj jpa(Vj)) is a standard conditional proba-
bility, which can be derived from individual iís joint probability function over the
variables using Bayesís rule.26 In the causal case, Pri(vj jpa(Vj)) can be calculated
as follows (and is sometimes denoted Pri(vj jjpa(Vj)) or Pri(vjnpa(Vj)) to mark the
di§erence; see also Pearl [2000]).
(i) Modify individual iís causal relevance relation by deleting relevance links from
any variable to any of the variables in PA(Vj). So, the variables in PA(Vj) have
no parents left (intuitively, they are set by an external intervention).
(ii) Modify the probability assignment to the variables PA(Vj) by letting them take
the values pa(Vj) with probability one (unconditionally, since these variables no
longer have any parents).
(iii) Relative to this new ìpost-interventionî Bayesian network, compute the prob-
ability that Vj takes the value vj in the usual way. This probability then co-
incides with the causally understood conditional probability Pri(vj jpa(Vj)) (=
Pri(vj jjpa(Vj))) of the initial Bayesian network.27
26Provided that Pr (pa(Vj)) 6= 0.
27To be precise, this causal conditional probability measures the possibly indirect causal e§ect of
the variables PA(Vj) on Vj , according to individual iís judgment. There may be such an e§ect even
if none of the variables in PA(Vj) are directly causally relevant to Vj according to individual iís
DAG, since Vj may depend on these variables indirectly. Note that PA(Vj) contains the parents
of Vj according to the aggregate DAG; these need not be parents of Vj according to individual iís
DAG. If we wanted to deÖne a direct causal conditional probability of vj , given pa(Vj), according
to individual iís DAG, we would have to re-do the calculation described in steps (i) to (iii) with
the set of variables PA(Vj) replaced by its subset consisting only of variables that are also parents
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Let us now turn to the third possible interpretation of the individualsí conditional
probabilities submitted at the second stage of our two-stage aggregation process: the
hypothetical interpretation. Here, individuals are asked to entertain the hypothesis
that the aggregate causal relevance relation is correct and to express conditional
probabilities based on this hypothesis. It is unclear, however, whether and how
Pri(vj jpa(Vj)) can be derived from the individualsí Bayesian networks. This raises a
number of challenges for future research.
6 A Önal challenge
The Örst stage of our two-stage approach restricts the second by requiring the ag-
gregate probability function to display certain conditional independencies mandated
by the aggregate causal relevance relation. Roughly, the fewer causal links are ac-
cepted at the Örst stage, the more probabilistic independencies are enforced at the
second stage. In the extreme case in which no variable is deemed causally relevant
to any other variable, the second stage produces an aggregate probability judgment
according to which every variable is probabilistically independent of every other. Ac-
cepting few causal connections has the advantage of reducing the complexity of the
probability aggregation problem at the second stage but the potential disadvantage
of over-restricting the admissible probability assignments. This restriction is prob-
lematic when the sparse set of accepted causal links between variables is not a result
of the individuals believing in sparse causal links but a result of a causal judgment
aggregation rule setting a high threshold for the acceptance of causal links.
We are thus faced with a trade-o§ between (i) the goal of reducing the complexity
of the probability aggregation problem (achieved via a high threshold for accepting
causal links between variables) and (ii) the goal of representing causal e§ects between
variables when there are such e§ects (achieved via a low threshold for accepting causal
links). We have argued that a high threshold for accepting causal links may help to
prevent a cyclical aggregate causal relevance relation, whereas in other situations,
particularly if the variables can be put into a temporal order, even a low threshold
(perhaps lower than the majority threshold) guarantees acyclicity. We leave it as a
challenge for future research to come up with causal judgment aggregation rules that
perform well on both aspects of this trade-o§: being neither too permissive nor too
restrictive in accepting causal links while avoiding cyclical causal judgments.
of Vj according to iís DAG. This subset may be empty, in which case the direct causal conditional
probability of vj , given pa(Vj), coincides with the unconditional probability of vj .
22
References
[1980] AczÈl, J., and C. Wagner. 1980. ìA characterization of weighted arithmetic
means.î SIAM Journal on Algebraic and Discrete Methods 1: 259-260.
[2007] Bradley, R. 2007. ìReaching a Consensus.î Social Choice and Welfare 29(4):
609-632.
[2007] Dietrich, F. 2007. ìA generalised model of judgment aggregation.î Social
Choice and Welfare 28(4): 529-565.
[2007] Dietrich, F., and C. List. 2007. ìJudgment aggregation by quota rules: major-
ity voting generalized.î Journal of Theoretical Politics 19(4): 391-424.
[2008] Dietrich, F., and C. List. 2008. ìA liberal paradox for judgment aggregation.î
Social Choice and Welfare 31(1): 59-78.
[2010] Dietrich, F., and C. List. 2010. ìThe impossibility of unbiased judgment ag-
gregation.î Theory and Decision 68(3): 281-299.
[2010] Dietrich, F., and C. List. 2010. ìMajority voting on restricted domains.î Jour-
nal of Economic Theory 145(2): 441-466.
[2007] Dietrich, F., and C. List. 2007. ìOpinion pooling on general agendas.î Working
paper, London School of Economics.
[1984] Genest, C., and K. Wagner. 1984. ìFurther Evidence against Independence
Preservation in Expert judgment Synthesis.î Technical Report 84-10, Dept. of
Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of Waterloo.
[1986] Genest, C., and J. V. Zidek. 1986. ìCombining Probability Distributions: A
Critique and Annotated Bibliography.î Statistical Science 1(1): 113-135.
[1981] Lehrer, K., and C. Wagner. 1981. Rational Consensus in Science and Society,
Dordrecht: Reidel.
[2001] List, C. 2001. Mission Impossible? The Problem of Democratic Aggregation in
the Face of Arrowís Theorem. DPhil thesis, Oxford University.
[2002] List, C., and P. Pettit. 2002. ìAggregating sets of judgments: an impossibility
result.î Economics and Philosophy 18(1): 89-110.
[2004] List, C., and P. Pettit. 2004. ìAggregating sets of judgments: two impossibility
results compared.î Synthese 140(1-2): 207-235.
[2003] List, C. 2003. ìA Possibility Theorem on Aggregation over Multiple Proposi-
tions.î Mathematical Social Sciences 45(1): 1-13; see also the corrigendum in
Mathematical Social Sciences 52(1): 109-110 (2006).
23
[2004] List, C. 2004. ìA Model of Path-Dependence in Decisions over Multiple Propo-
sitions.î American Political Science Review 98(3): 495-513.
[2012] List, C. 2012. ìThe theory of judgment aggregation: An introductory review.î
Synthese 187(1): 179-207.
[2009] List, C., and C. Puppe. 2009. ìJudgment aggregation: a survey.î In Oxford
Handbook of Rational and Social Choice, ed. P. Anand, C. Puppe, and P.
Pattanaik, 457-482, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[1981] McConway, K. J. 1981. ìMarginalization and Linear Opinion Pools.î Journal
of the American Statistical Association 76(374): 410-414.
[2009] Miller, M. K., and D. Osherson. 2009. ìMethods for distance-based judgment
aggregation.î Social Choice and Welfare 32(4): 575-601.
[2006] Pauly, M., and M. van Hees. 2006. ìLogical constraints on judgment aggrega-
tion.î Journal of Philosophical Logic 35(6): 569-585.
[2000] Pearl, J. 2000. Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
[2006] Pigozzi, G. 2006. ìBelief merging and the discursive dilemma: an argument-
based account to paradoxes in judgment aggregation.î Synthese 152(2): 285-
298.
[1990] Glymour, C., P. Spirtes, and R. Scheines. 1990. ìIndependence Relations Pro-
duced by Parameter Values in Causal Models.î Philosophical Topics 18(2):
55-70.
[2000] Spirtes, P., C. Glymour, and R. Scheines. 2000. Causation, Prediction and
Search, 2nd ed., Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
[1982] Wagner, C. 1982. ìAllocation, Lehrer Models, and the Consensus of Probabil-
ities.î Theory and Decision 14(2): 207-220.
[1985] Wagner, C. 1985. ìOn the Formal Properties of Weighted Averaging as a
Method of Aggregation.î Synthese 62(1): 97-108.
24
